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Expectations and Bubbles in Asset Pricing Exper-
iments
Abstract: We present results on expectation formation in a controlled experimental en-
vironment. In each period subjects are asked to predict the next price of a risky asset.
The realized market price is derived from an unknown market equilibrium equation with
feedback from individual forecasts. In most experiments prices deviate from the benchmark
fundamental and bubbles emerge endogenously. These bubbles are inconsistent with ra-
tional expectations and seem to be driven by trend chasing behavior or “positive feedback
expectations” of the participants. We also analyze individual predictions of participants and
…nd that participants within a group tend to coordinate on a common prediction strategy.
Keywords: experimental economics, expectations, asset pricing, speculative bubbles
JEL classi…cation code: C91, C92, D84, G12, G14
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1 Introduction
The exuberant rise and fall in stock prices in recent years has drawn renewed at-
tention to the possible existence of so-called speculative price bubbles. Such bubbles,
where a stock is traded at prices signi…cantly higher than (and seemingly unrelated
to) the fundamental value of the stock, are closely related to traders’ (optimistic)
expectations about the future price of the stock. Traders buy an asset that is already
‘overpriced’ because they expect the price of this asset to increase even more and
they want to bene…t from the perceived capital gains of a further price increase.
There have been many empirical studies on the question of whether part of the
‡uctuations in stock prices can be attributed to speculative price bubbles (see for
example Flood and Garber 1980, West 1987, Froot and Obstfeld, 1991). Garber
(1990), for example, argues that even the widely acknowledged “classical” bubbles
known as the Dutch Tulipmania (1634-1637), the Mississippi Bubble (1719-1720) and
the South Sea Bubble (1720) can be explained, to a large extent, by changes in market
fundamentals. There are also some theoretical papers on the possibility of rational
bubbles (i.e., speculative price bubbles consistent with rational expectations). Tirole
(1982) claims that in a model with a …nite number of in…nitely lived traders, common
knowledge of rationality inhibits the possibility of trade against prices di¤erent from
the market fundamental. Trade against nonfundamental prices can occur if traders
do not have a common prior about the distribution of private signals about the
fundamental value. Tirole (1985) shows that rational bubbles are possible in an
overlapping generations model with …nitely lived traders, provided that the growth
rate of the economy is larger than the return on the stock. Diba and Grossman
(1988) use the nonnegativity of stock prices to rule out the existence of rational
bubbles. Finally, Santos and Woodford (1997) analyse the possibility of bubbles
in a general intertemporal competitive equilibrium framework. They conclude that
rational bubbles can occur only under rather special circumstances.
The occurrence of price bubbles in experimental asset markets is less controversial.
The possibility of experimental bubbles was …rst recognized in an intriguing paper by
Smith et al. (1988). They investigate an experimental asset market where an asset
is traded that pays (uncertain) dividends for 15 consecutive periods. Participants
di¤er only in their endowments of the number of stocks and the amount of money,
but there is no asymmetric information. Bubbles, where the asset is traded at prices
above the fundamental value, emerge in most of the experiments. This remarkable
…nding has been corroborated in many other asset market experiments, with varying
designs (e.g., King et al. 1993, Porter and Smith 1995, Noussair et al. 2001, Smith
et al. 2000).
Many of these experimenters conjecture that expectations play an important role
in generating bubbles. Referring to the theoretical result by Tirole (1982), Smith et
al. conjecture that it is a lack of common expectations (i.e., a lack of a common prior)
that drives the emergence of bubbles. That is, although every participant has the
same information, a participant engages in trade at a price higher than the intrinsic
value of the stock because he or she believes it possibble to sell it to somebody later
on at an even higher price. However, in a recent experimental paper Lei et al. (2001)
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show that, even if speculation is prohibited (that is, a subject can only buy or only
sell the asset, but subjects are not able to do both in order to reap the capital gains),
bubbles occur. They claim that this points to irrationality of participants instead of
a lack of common expectations.
Although their main interest lies with the trading decisions of participants, Smith
et al. also try to obtain explicit information on the expectations of the participants
of the experiment. In some of their experiments each participant is asked to give a
forecast for the mean trading price. The participant with the lowest mean forecast
error over the course of the experiment earns an additional $1.00. Williams (1987)
uses the same method to study expectation formation in an experimental double
auction market. However, in both kinds of experiments observations on expectation
formation follow as a by-product of the experiment and might therefore not be very
accurate.1
In the present paper we present an experiment which focuses explicitly on expec-
tation formation of participants. We consider a standard asset pricing framework,
where the only task for the participants is to predict the asset price for the next
period. They do not have knowledge of the underlying market equilibrium equation,
but they know all past realized prices and, of course, their own predictions. Further-
more, they have perfect knowledge about the dividend process and could use this to
compute the rational expectations fundamental price. In fact, the dividend process
is IID so that the corresponding rational expectations fundamental price is constant.
Participants’ earnings are inversely related to the average prediction error they make.
Given the price forecast of a participant, a computer program computes the associ-
ated optimal trading decision and subsequently the market equilibrium price. Clearly,
the realized price is a function of the individual forecasts. This expectations feedback
is an important feature of economic dynamic systems in general and …nancial markets
in particular. Our experiment is designe such that we obtain explicit information
about the expectations of participants in such a controlled expectations feedback
environment.
Our main contribution is that, even in this simple stationary setup, price bubbles
emerge. This is due to so-called positive feedback expectations; that is, participants
seem to extrapolate trends in realized asset prices into the future. If the asset price in-
creases (decreases), participants expect a further increase (decrease). This expected
price increase (decrease) is self-ful…lling and leads to a further price increase (de-
crease). The current paper is the …rst to establish this type of purely expectations-
driven experimental price bubbles. We also analyze individual predictions, and a
second important result is that the forecasts are very similar for participants in the
same group. Therefore coordination on a common prediction strategy occurs, which
contrasts with the conjecture of lack of common expectations by Smith et al. (1988).
There is substantial evidence that many people, much like the participants in
our experiment, try to extrapolate trends when forecasting the price of a stock (see
also Hirshleifer 2001, Barberis and Thaler 2003, section 5). This implies that these
1This is also argued in Hey (1994) who points out that (p.230) “In these studies, the question of
expectations formation has tended to be of rather peripheral concern, with the data on expectations
elicited in a somewhat unsatisfactory and only partial motivated manner.”
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people will buy (sell) the stock if its price has increased (decreased) in anticipation
of a further price increase (decrease). De Long et al. (1990) call such traders posi-
tive feedback traders. Many trading strategies used by professional investors search
for trends in the data and give buy or sell signals on the basis of an extrapolation
of such trends. There is also experimental and empirical evidence on extrapolative
expectations and positive feedback trading. In Andreassen and Kraus (1990) several
experimental studies are described where participants are confronted with a historical
stock price series and are asked to trade stocks at these prices in order to maximize
their wealth. After they have made a trading decision the next price, which is inde-
pendent of their trading decision and forecasts, is revealed. Apparently participants
tend to buy when prices are low and sell when prices are high, which is consistent
with conventional economic wisdom. However, when the saliency of price changes is
high; that is, when similar price changes occur often, the variance of these changes
is low or the mean absolute value of these changes is large, participants tend to use
price changes instead of price levels, for making a trading decision. In that case they
are more likely to buy (sell) stock when the price has been rising (falling). De Bondt
(1993) presents further evidence from experiments and surveys that people tend to
extrapolate trends when predicting stock prices. Finally, Frankel and Froot (1988)
investigate survey data on exchange rates and …nd that, in the short run, traders
expect the exchange rate to depreciate further after a depreciation.
Although it has been recognized for quite some time that a theory of how people
form expectations and learn in an expectations feedback environment is important
for understanding many economic phenomena (see e.g. the survey by Evans and
Honkapohja 2001), our work is among the …rst to experimentally test expectations
in such an environment. The experimental approach indeed seems very suitable for
studying expectations, since it provides explicit observations on expectations in a
controlled environment, which is an advantage over using survey data about expec-
tations (as is done, for example, by Frankel and Froot 1987, 1988, Shiller 1990). The
only earlier paper employing a method similar to ours is Marimon et al. (1993).
They solicit predictions from participants in an overlapping generations framework,
and the computer program then computes the associated optimal demand. There
have been a number of other experiments designed to study expectation formation in
a time series context (e.g. Schmalensee 1976, Dwyer et al. 1993, Hey 1994), but these
experiments disregard the expectations feedback, which is a key feature of dynamic
economic models and which we want to account for explicitly. In van de Velden (2001)
the experimental approach is used for investigating expectation formation in a simple
cobweb type commodity market with a production lag structure. There it was shown
that, for an unstable cobweb model, the heterogeneity of expectations leads to excess
volatility of realized prices. In another closely related paper, Hommes et al. (2005)
run experiments in an asset pricing environment similar to the one studied here, but
with a structure that inhibits the possibility of price bubbles. In particular, in the
experiment presented in that paper an upper bound on prices and predictions is used
that is much lower than the one in the experiment presented here. Moreover, the
experiment in Hommes et al. includes a fundamentalist ‘robot’ trader, who always
predicts the fundamental price and has a stabilizing impact on asset prices.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the asset pricing model
we use in the experiment. Section 3 describes the design of the experiment.2 Section
4 presents an analysis of the aggregate behavior of the asset prices and Section 5
discusses the individual prediction strategies. Concluding remarks are given in Section
6.
2 Asset Prices and Expectations
2.1 The asset pricing model
Consider an asset market with H traders, indexed by h. A trader can invest his
money in a risk free asset (e.g., a savings deposit) with a risk free gross rate of return
R = 1+ r, where r is the real interest rate, or he can invest his money in shares of an
in…nitely lived risky asset. The price of this risky asset in period t is pt. Furthermore,
for each share dividends yt are paid out in period t. We assume these dividends to be
independently and identically distributed with mean y and variance ¾2y. Denote by
zht the number of shares of the risky asset purchased by trader h in period t. Note
that zht can be positive as well as negative. If it is negative it means that trader h
sells a number of shares of the risky asset in period t. The trader’s realized wealth in
period t + 1 then is
Wh;t+1 = RWh;t + (pt+1 + yt+1 ¡ Rpt) zht:
Traders’ subjective beliefs about the evolution of wealth are characterized by their
subjective conditional mean Eht and their subjective conditional variance Vht. Traders
are mean-variance optimizers; that is, their demand for shares corresponds to the
solution to
max
zht
Uh (Wt+1) = max
zht
½
Eht (Wt+1) ¡ 12aVht (Wt+1)
¾
= max
zht
½
zhtEht (pt+1 + yt+1 ¡ Rpt)¡ 12az
2
htVht (pt+1+ yt+1 ¡ Rpt)
¾
;
where a measures the degree of risk aversion (assumed to be the same for all traders).
We assume Vht (pt+1 + yt+1 ¡ Rpt) = ¾2, for all h; that is, traders believe that the
conditional variance of excess returns is constant (and this constant is the same for
all traders). There is no harm in this assumption since the present paper deals only
with point predictions of traders and not with traders’ beliefs about the distribution
of returns. The solution is given by
zht =
Eht (pt+1 + yt+1 ¡ Rpt)
a¾2
: (1)
Let zs denote the outside supply of shares. The market equilibrium condition now
becomes
HX
h=1
zht =
1
a¾2
HX
h=1
Eht (pt+1 + yt+1 ¡ Rpt) = zs: (2)
2An appendix containing some auxiliary information about the experimental setup is available
on the JEBO website.
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Notice that today’s asset price is determined by beliefs about tomorrow’s asset
price and dividend. Hence, when traders have to make a prediction for the price
in period t + 1 they do not know the price in period t yet, and they can only use
information up till time t ¡ 1. Without loss of generality we assume that there is
no outside supply of shares, zs = 0. Equation (1) can then be interpreted as excess
demand. The market equilibrium equation (2) can now be rewritten as
Rpt =
1
H
HX
h=1
Eht (pt+1 + yt+1) : (3)
An important feature of the asset pricing model is its self-con…rming nature: if all
traders have a high (low) prediction the realized price will also be high (low). This
feature is characteristic for a speculative asset market: if traders expect a high price,
the demand for the risky asset will be high, and as a consequence the realized market
price will be high, assuming that the supply is …xed.
The basic equation of the asset pricing model is equation (3). The development
of the asset price depends upon the (subjective) expectations of the traders. We
will consider the dynamics of the asset pricing model under rational expectations in
Subsection 2.2. In Subsection 2.3 we will discuss the dynamics of the asset pricing
model under boundedly rational prediction strategies.
2.2 The fundamental solution and rational bubbles
Under rational expectations the subjective expectation Eht of trader h is equal to
the objective mathematical conditional expectation Et, for all h. Equation (3) then
reduces to
Rpt = Et (pt+1 + yt+1) :
After K steps of repeated substitution we …nd
pt =
Et (pt+K)
RK
+
KX
k=1
Et (yt+k)
Rk
;
where we have used EtEt+k (:) = Et (:) for k > 0. There are two types of solu-
tions. Sometimes the solution paths are required to satisfy the no-bubbles condition
limK!1
Et(pt+K)
RK = 0. Given this condition we have
pt =
1X
k=1
Et (yt+k)
Rk
;
which equals the present discounted value of the expected future dividends. This
solution will be denoted the fundamental price pf . For the IID dividend process that
we have speci…ed, this fundamental price is
pf =
y
R ¡ 1 =
y
r :
7
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Figure 1: Fundamental value and rational bubbles in the asset pricing model
According to the e¢cient market hypothesis the price of the asset should be equal
to pt = pf , for all t. However, there is, a priori, no convincing reason why the no-
bubbles condition should hold. In fact, it can easily be checked that under rational
expectations any solution of the form
pbt = R
tc+ pf = Rtc+
y
r
; c ¸ 0 (4)
is a rational expectations solution satisfying (3). These solutions are called rational
bubbles. They grow with a rate R, and a solution exists for each c ¸ 0. Hence,
under rational expectations there is a continuum of (exploding) solution orbits. Note
that both types of rational expectations solutions correspond to self-ful…lling perfect
foresight expectations: when all traders predict the fundamental price, the realized
market will be equal to the fundamental price, and when all traders believe that the
price deviation from the fundamental grows by the gross rate of return each period,
the price of the asset will indeed grow with the gross rate of return.
Figure 1 shows the fundamental solution and four rational bubble solutions. The
values of the parameters y and r correspond to the parameter values in our exper-
imental design. An important question we try to answer in this paper is whether
the participants in the experimental asset market will coordinate on the fundamental
solution or on one of the rational bubble solutions.
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2.3 Boundedly rational prediction strategies
The rational expectations hypothesis is quite demanding. It requires that traders
know the underlying asset pricing model and use this to compute the conditional ex-
pectation for the future price and that they do not make structural forecast errors. In
particular, in a heterogeneous world rational expectations requires knowledge about
the beliefs of all other traders. A rational expectations solution will only prevail when
traders are able to coordinate on one of the possible rational expectations equilibria.
In this section we discuss the asset pricing model when agents use simple forecasting
rules. They do not have (exact) knowledge of the underlying model, but have their
own beliefs about the development of asset prices and use this belief and the available
time series observations to predict the price. The beliefs of the traders are sometimes
called the perceived laws of motion. Given these perceived laws of motion the under-
lying model (3) is then referred to as the implied actual law of motion. An important
objective of this paper is to get some insight into the nature of the perceived laws of
motion people actually use. We assume that when traders have to predict a price for
time t + 1, they know the interest rate r (which is constant over time), the realized
prices up to time t¡ 1 and their own price predictions up to time t. We assume that
the IID dividend process yt = y + ±t is common knowledge and Ehtyt = y for all h
and all t. The market equilibrium price in (3) then simpli…es to
pt =
1
RH
HX
h=1
Eht (pt+1) +
y
R
:
A general form of a trader’s forecasting rule or prediction strategy is
Eht (pt+1) = peh;t+1 = fh
¡
pt¡1; pt¡2; : : : ; p1; peht; peh;t¡1; : : : ; peh1; y; r
¢
; (5)
where fh can be any (possibly time-varying) function. There are no restrictions on
the speci…cation fh, and the possibilities are therefore unbounded.3 Given traders’
forecasting rules (5), the implied actual law of motion becomes
pt =
1
RH
HX
h=1
fh
¡
pt¡1; pt¡2; : : : ; p1; peht; p
e
h;t¡1; : : : ; p
e
h1; y; r
¢
+
y
R
: (6)
The actual dynamics of prices is to a great extent characterized by the prediction
strategies used by the traders. Depending on the prediction strategies used by the
agents, almost any type of price behavior can occur. Brock and Hommes (1998), for
example, study an evolutionary competition between di¤erent prediction strategies
in this framework and …nd that this may lead to complicated dynamics, possibly with
asset prices and returns moving on a strange attractor.
An important feature of our asset pricing model is that it is stable in the sense
that if traders (on average) do not expect prices to diverge too fast, the asset price
3Notice that traders have all necessary information (the risk free rate of return r and the mean
dividend y) to calculate the fundamental price pf = yr and use this as their forecast.
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will converge to a steady state. Consider, for example, the case where traders have
naive or static expectations, where
peh;t+1 = pt¡1;
that is, their prediction for the next price corresponds to the last observed asset
price. Under the assumption that all traders have naive expectations the implied law
of motion becomes a linear di¤erence equation
pt =
1
1 + r
¡
pt¡1+ rpf
¢
:
which has steady state pf = yr and slope
1
1+r . Since the slope lies between 0 and
1, prices converge monotonically to the steady state. The asset pricing model is
stable under naive expectations, and there is (slow and monotonic) convergence to
the steady state because the slope is close to 1. The stability property is a more
general characteristic of the model as can be seen by rewriting (3) as
pt ¡ pf = 11 + r
¡
pet+1 ¡ pf
¢
; (7)
where pet+1 = 1H
PH
h=1 p
e
h;t+1 is the average prediction for period t + 1. It follows
that the realized price will always lie between the average price prediction pet+1 and
the fundamental price pf = yr . If traders on average do not extrapolate too strongly,
the fundamental steady state is stable. The convergence may be slow, however. The
fundamental steady state is also locally stable under more sophisticated forms of
learning, such as least squares learning (see Evans and Honkapohja, pp.220-222) or
eductive learning (see Guesnerie 2002).
It should be clear that bubbles can only occur in this framework if traders expect
them to occur. For example, if traders believe that prices grow with rate ¯ >
p
R
each period, their predictions are given by
peh;t+1 = ¯
2pt¡1;
and prices in fact grow with rate ¯
2
R > 1. We will refer to these exploding solutions
as speculative bubbles. As noted before, the asset pricing model has a self-con…rming
nature: if traders expect prices to explode, it is likely that prices will indeed explode.
In fact, if ¯ is close to R these bubble expectations are approximately self-ful…lling.
3 Experimental design
We consider an experimental asset pricing model with 6 participants per market,
where each market lasts for 50 periods. In total 36 subjects (6 groups) participated
in this experiment. Subjects (mostly undergraduates in economics, chemistry and
psychology) were recruited by means of announcements on information boards in
university buildings. The computerized experiment was conducted in the CREED
10
Page 10 of 26 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
laboratory. It lasted for approximately 1:5 hours, and average earnings were 21:63
Dutch guilders (¼ 9:81 EURO).
In …nancial markets traders are involved in two related activities: prediction and
trade. They make a prediction concerning the future price of the risky asset, and
given this prediction, they make a trading decision. The experiment is aimed at
investigating the way subjects form predictions. Given the predictions made by sub-
jects the computer derives individual demand from mean-variance maximization as
given by the optimal demand function (1). Each subject therefore acts as an advisor
or a professional forecaster and is paired with one computerized trader, which may
be thought of as a large pension fund. The subject has to make the most accurate
prediction for this trader, and then the trader (i.e., the computer) decides how much
to trade. The earnings of the subjects in the experiment are determined by their
prediction accuracy.
The experiment is presented to the participants as follows. The participants are
told that they are an advisor to a pension fund and that this pension fund can
invest its money in a risky asset (the stock market) or in a risk free asset (a bank
account). The task of the advisor (i.e., the participant) is to predict the price of the
risky asset. Participants know that the price of the asset is determined by market
equilibrium between demand and supply of the asset. Although they do not know
the exact underlying market equilibrium equation, they are informed that the higher
their forecast is, the larger will be the fraction of money invested in the risky asset
and the larger will be the demand for stocks. They also have information about
fundamentals: they know the mean dividend y and the interest rate r. Participants
do not know the investment strategy of the pension fund they are advising and the
investment strategies of the other pension funds. They also do not know how many
pension funds are in this market exactly, and they do not know the identity of the
other members of the group.. They are not explicitly informed about the fact that
the price of the asset depends on their prediction and the prediction of the other
participants.
The information for the participants is given in computerized instructions. Com-
prehension of the instructions is checked by two control questions. At the beginning
of the experiment the participants are given two sheets of paper with a summary of
all necessary information, general information, information about the stock market,
information about the investment strategies of the pension funds, forecasting task of
the …nancial advisor and information about the earnings. The information on the
handout summarizes the computerized instructions. The handout also contains in-
formation about the …nancial parameters (mean dividend and risk free rate of return)
with which an accurate prediction of the fundamental price can be made. Finally they
are given a table from which they can read, for a given forecast error, their earnings
(see Appendix B). Appendix A contains an English translation of the information
given to the participants.
In every period t in the experiment the task of the participants is to predict the
price of the risky asset in period t + 1, given the available information. This infor-
mation consists of past prices of the risky asset pt¡1; pt¡2; : : : ; p1 and past individual
predictions peht; peh;t¡1; : : : ; peh1. Recall that participants also know the interest rate
11
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Figure 2: English translation of the computer screen as seen by the participants
during the experiment. Predictions and prices have di¤erent colors. The Y ¡axis is
0¡100 to start with, but is rescaled when pricesnpredictions are above 100 (200; 300,
etc.).
r = 0:05 and the mean y = 3 of the IID dividend process. In periods 1 and 2 no
information about past prices is available, but the subjects are told that their price
forecast has to be between 0 and 100 in these …rst two periods (notice that the fun-
damental price in our experiment equals pf = yr = 60). For practical reasons, we had
to impose an upper bound on prices and predictions. We chose this upper bound
to be equal to 1000. The participants are not informed about this in advance. If,
in a certain period, a participant predicts a price higher than 1000, the computer
screen will notify him or her that predictions above 1000 are not accepted and that
the participant has to submit a new and lower prediction.4
At the end of period t, when all predictions for period t+1 have been submitted,
the participants are informed about the realized market price in period t and earnings
for that period are revealed. Figure 2 shows an English translation of the computer
screen the participants are facing during the experiment. On the screen the subjects
are informed about their earnings in the previous period, total earnings, a table of the
last twenty prices and the corresponding predictions and a time series of the prices
and the predictions.
Recall that the market equilibrium price is given by
4The choice not to inform participants about the upper bound of 1000 was motivated by the fact
that such an upper bound also does not exist in real …nancial markets. Moreover, we did not expect
the upper bound would be reached, since it is 10 times the upper bound of 100 of the …rst period
(which is also used in Hommes et al.) and the most explosive rational bubble (eq. (4) with c = 40)
reaches the upper bound not earlier than at t = 65. However, since in most experimental groups the
upper bound was reached, some participants received additional information during the experiment.
A potential problem, pointed out to us by a referee, is that participants might talk about this upper
bound in between sessions. The similarity between results from di¤erent sessions suggests that this
did not happen. In the remainder of the paper we focus primarily on what happens before the upper
bound is reached for the …rst time.
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pt =
1
1 + r
"
1
6
6X
h=1
peh;t+1 + y
#
; (8)
where H = 6 is the number of participants. The earnings of the participants consist of
a “show-up” fee of 10 Dutch guilders (1 Dutch guilder is approximately 0:45 EURO)
and of the earnings from the experiment that depend upon their forecasting errors.
The number of points earned in period t by participant h is given by the quadratic
scoring rule
eht = max
½
1300¡ 1300
49
(pt ¡ peht)2 ; 0
¾
;
where 1300 points is equivalent to 1 Dutch guilder. Given their role as advisors
it seems reasonable to reward participants according to their prediction accuracy.5
Notice that earnings are zero in period t when jpt ¡ pehtj > 7 in order to shield
participants from losing money in the experiment.
4 Aggregate behavior of asset prices
In this section we discuss the aggregate behavior of the asset prices.6 Figure 3 gives
the realized prices for the six di¤erent sessions. The most striking feature is that
in 5 of the 6 groups the realized price approaches 1000 and subsequently drops, and
hence a bubble seems to occur in these groups. In 4 of these 5 groups the bubble
seems to “burst” because price forecasts are restricted to be below 1000. In group
6, however, the bubble bursts earlier (the maximum value of the asset price in that
group is 749:62 in period 29), which can therefore not be attributed to the existence
of the upper limit.7 Notice also that the upper bound of 1000 is approximately 16
times the fundamental price pf = 60. In group 1 the upper bound is not reached, but
the maximum realized asset price is still a factor 3 or 4 larger than the fundamental
price.
Let us now describe some other general features of the evolution of asset prices.
First consider the ‘atypical’ group 1, where no bubble occurs. In this group there are
some sudden jumps in the asset price. These jumps are due to very high predictions of
individual participants.8 Apart from these jumps, the time series of the realized prices
5Alternatively, one could reward participants according to realized utility Uh;t+1, which is maxi-
mized at peh;t+1 = pt+1. The experimental data show that for the individuals within an experimental
group the correlation between average realized utility and average squared prediction error is perfect.
Moreover, the di¤erence between realized utility and the highest attainable utility level (obtained for
peh;t+1 = pt+1) is proportional to the quadratic forecast error (see Hommes 2001). Using quadratic
forecast error as a performance measure therefore seems to be equivalent with using realized utility.
Another interesting option is to reward participants according to realized pro…ts or according to a
weighted average of quadratic forecast error and realized pro…ts. We leave this for future work.
6A complete set of data will be made available upon request.
7 In each of the groups 2 to 5 there are at least 4 participants with a highest prediction of 999 or
1000, whereas the highest prediction in group 6 is 906.
8For period 7 participant 6 predicts a price of 448:70, for period 11 participant 1 predicts a price
of 1000 and for period 29 participant 6 predicts a price of 908:80. A similar sudden jump occurs in
period 14 in group 5, where participant 3 predicts a price of 1000 for period 15.
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Figure 3: Realized prices in the experiment for the di¤erent groups.
moves towards the fundamental price of 60 in an oscillatory fashion. Also for groups
5 and 6 prices seem to settle down in the …rst 20 periods, after which the emergence
of the bubble is “triggered”. Now let us turn to groups 2 to 6 and consider what
happens when prices approach 1000. Since there is an upper bound on predictions,
the realized price will eventually stop increasing.9 Predictions will decrease, which
will be followed by a decrease in realized prices. For all groups (except group 6) the
price subsequently falls to the lowest value since the start of the experiment.10 After
this minimum the price increases again and reaches another peak (except for group
5), which is typically rather high but not as high as the …rst peak. Subsequently the
price decreases again (followed by yet another peak in group 4). This suggest that
the dynamics in most of the groups is driven by the interaction between participants
trying to extrapolate trends and the restrictions on the price predictions of 0 and 1000.
Also, since the height of the respective “booms” decreases over time and the frequency
with which these booms occur increases, one might conjecture that the realized prices
9Actually, the maximum value the realized price can attain is pmax = 2021 (1000 + 3) = 955
5
21 . In
groups 2, 3, 4 and 5 the price actually comes close to this maximum price (934:54, 931:11, 954:75,
940:16, with implied averages predictions of 978:27, 974:67, 999:49 and 984:17, respectively) and in
group 6 the highest realized price is 749:62 (with an implied average prediction of 784:1), which is
also more than 12 times the fundamental price.
10The subsequent minimum prices for groups 2¡6 are given by 36:95, 9:68, 9:21, 12:56 and 27:29,
respectively.
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Figure 4: Plots of qt+1 ¡ qt against t for groups 2¡ 6. The horizontal lines re‡ect the
corresponding value along a rational bubble (i.e. lnR ¼ 0:0488).
will eventually converge to the neighborhood of the fundamental price.
We analyze the behavior of the asset prices along the …rst bubble further by
considering the following two questions: i) do the observed bubbles correspond to
rational bubbles? ii) is the experimental asset market e¢cient?
4.1 The nature of the experimental bubbles
Along a rational bubble we have pt = pf +Rtc (i.e., prices grow with a constant rate,
the risk free gross rate of return R = 1+r). Now consider the series qt = ln
¡
pt ¡ pf¢.
If prices evolve according to a rational bubble we have qt = ln c+ t ln R and qt+1¡qt =
lnR. Figure 4 plots qt+1 ¡ qt against t for groups 2¡ 6.
A few remarks on the data we use are in order. Since the upper bound on price
predictions ‡attens the last part of the bubble, the last observation we take into
account is the last one that satis…es pt¡pt¡1 > pt¡1¡pt¡2. On the other hand, qt only
exists when the price is above the fundamental value, and since in all experiments the
price starts out below the fundamental value, we discard the …rst fewobservations. We
also want to allow for some coordination and learning. Therefore we use observations
starting at period t = 7, except for groups 5 and 6 where a bubble sets in after quite
some time. The number of observations along the bubble for the last two groups is
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pretty small. From Figure 4 it follows that, although over some intervals qt+1 ¡ qt
seems to be approximately constant, its value is much higher than ln R ¼ 0:0488.
From this we conclude that the bubbles observed in the experiment do not correspond
to rational bubbles, but seem to be speculative bubbles driven by the (boundedly
rational) prediction strategies of the participants.11 Table 1 shows, for each group,
the average value of qt+1 ¡ qt along the bubble, the implied growth rate bR and the
theoretical growth rate R of a rational bubble. In all groups, except for group 5,
the mean value of qt+1 ¡ qt is signi…cantly di¤erent from lnR ¼ 0:0488 at the 5%
signi…cance level.
group qt+1 ¡ qt bR R sample
2 0.222 1.248¤ 1.050 7-26
3 0.292 1.339¤ 1.050 7-29
4 0.310 1.363¤ 1.050 7-21
5 0.227 1.255 1.050 29-37
6 0.271 1.311¤ 1.050 23-29
Table 1: Test of the rational bubbles hypothesis. A * indicates that the estimate ofbR is signi…cantly di¤erent from 1:050 at the 5% level.
Let us conclude this discussion about the bubbles with two observations. First,
since there is no exogenous uncertainty in the model rational agents would make no
forecast errors along the bubble and hence have high earnings. Since the average
earnings (see Appendix C) are fairly low this is not the case in the experiment.
Secondly, given that the …rst price is below 100 and for a rational bubble the growth
rate equals R, along a rational bubble the price approaches 1000 not sooner than at
t = 65 (since 60 + 40£ 1:0564 = 968).
From this analysis we conclude that our laboratory asset pricing experiments
exhibit endogenous speculative bubbles. An explanation for this is that participants
try to extrapolate trends. If, by accident, prices increase slightly and agents perceive
this increase, they tend to extrapolate the trend and expect a further price increase.
Due to the selfcon…rming nature of the asset pricing model, this leads to an actual
price increase, which is extrapolated again. Clearly, this process will lead to a price
bubble. This mechanism is also consistent with the results in groups 5 and 6. There
it seems that the asset price is relatively stable for quite some time until it starts
to increase somewhat. This increase in the price is perceived by the participants
as an upward trend, which they subsequently extrapolate, leading to the explosion
of prices. Following the literature on positive feedback trading (see for example De
Long et al.) we refer to this trend chasing behavior as positive feedback expectations.
Unfortunately, this type of behavior fails to explain why the bubbles in groups 5 and
6 do not occur earlier and why the bubble in group 6 bursts prematurely.
11The use of the word “speculative” does not mean that participants can enter into speculative
trades by buying and selling the asset, but refers to the speculative or extrapolative expectations
participants use.
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Figure 5: Excess returns of realized asset prices.
4.2 E¢ciency and predictability
A celebrated result from the theory on …nancial markets is the so-called e¢cient
market hypothesis. This hypothesis claims that all information on an asset is incor-
porated in its price, and it implies that one cannot obtain above “normal” pro…ts by
trading on a …nancial market. An implication of this hypothesis is that the excess
returns xt = lnpt ¡ lnpt¡1 are uncorrelated with past information. In particular,
the excess returns should not show serial correlation; otherwise traders can improve
their prediction of the excess return by using its past values. Although the …nancial
markets in our experiment are highly stylized, we believe that we might learn more
about aggregate market behavior by investigating excess returns. Figure 5 shows the
excess returns in the six di¤erent groups.
For groups 2 to 6, there appears to be serial correlation in the excess returns over
the full sample of 50 periods. However, this serial correlation in returns is mainly due
to the large amplitude ‡uctuations in the last part of the return series after the price
series reaches its upper bound. Since the upper bound of 1000 is in fact an artifact
of our experimental setup to stop an exploding asset price, it is more interesting
to investigate informational (in)e¢ciency before the bubble reaches its upper bound.
Figure 6 shows the …rst 10 lags of the autocorrelation function where only observations
along the …rst bubble (i.e., the …rst 26, 29, 21, 37 and 29 observations in groups 2, 3,
4, 5 and 6, respectively) are used. Notice that when forecasting the price or return at
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Figure 6: Autocorrelation functions of the excess returns along the …rst bubble. We
consider the …rst 26, 29, 21, 37 and 29 observations. The horizontal lines in the
autocorrelation plots are the two standard error bounds at the 5% signi…cance level.
date t, only past prices or returns up to date t¡2 are in the information set so that a
signi…cant …rst order autocorrelation coe¢cient can not be exploited. During the …rst
part of the bubble the market seems to be approximately e¢cient according to our
autocorrelation test. Only group 3 is not fully informationally e¢cient, since it has
a signi…cant second order autocorrelation coe¢cient. Market e¢ciency is sometimes
also de…ned in terms of whether prices re‡ect economic fundamentals. Since in 5 out of
the 6 groups prices show large deviations from the rational expectations fundamental
price, our asset pricing experiments are not e¢cient in this sense.
5 Individual prediction strategies
We now turn to the individual prediction strategies of the participants in our asset
pricing experiment. Figure 7 shows, per group, the individual predictions of all
participants. Typically, the di¤erences between prediction strategies within groups
are small. This suggests that the di¤erent participants in a group coordinate on some
common prediction strategy, at least qualitatively.
This coordination of expectations is obtained in all six groups. To quantify our
qualitative observation that participants within a group coordinate on a common pre-
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Figure 7: Participants’ individual predictions per group.
diction strategy we consider, for each group, the average individual quadratic forecast
error 1T0H
PH
h=1
PT
t=t0+1
(peht ¡ pt)2, which corresponds to the individual quadratic
forecast error averaged over time and over participants within a group. This average
is based upon the last T0 ´ T ¡t0 observations in order to abstract from variations in
predictions and prices in the beginning of the experiment that are due to participants
trying to learn how to predict prices accurately. It is easily veri…ed that this average
individual quadratic forecast error can be broken up in two separate terms, as follows
1
T0H
HX
h=1
TX
t=t0+1
(peht ¡ pt)2 = 1T0H
HX
h=1
TX
t=t0+1
(peht ¡ pet)2 + 1T0
TX
t=t0+1
(pet ¡ pt)2 ; (9)
where pet =
1
H
PH
h=1 peht is the average prediction for period t in a group (averaged
over individuals in that group). The …rst term on the right-hand side of (9) measures
the dispersion between individual predictions, and we will refer to it as average dis-
persion error. It gives the squared distance between the individual prediction and the
average prediction pet within the group, averaged over time and participants. Note
that it equals 0 if and only if all participants in one group use exactly the same
prediction strategy. Hence, a small average dispersion implies coordination on a com-
mon prediction strategy. The second term on the right-hand side of (9) measures the
average squared distance between the mean prediction pet and the realized price pt.
19
Page 19 of 26 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
We will refer to this second term as the average common error. If individual expec-
tations can be described as “rational expectations with error”, where the error has
mean zero and is serially uncorrelated and uncorrelated with the errors of the other
participants, then we should expect that individual forecast errors cancel each other
out in the aggregate.12 If this is the case then this second term should be relatively
small.
Table 2 shows, for each of the six groups, how the average quadratic forecast error
is broken up in these two terms. Here t0 is taken to be equal to 10.
avg. individual error avg. dispersion error avg. common error
group 1T0H
P
h;t (p
e
ht ¡ pt)2 1T0H
P
h;t (p
e
ht ¡ pet)2 1T0
P
t (p
e
t ¡ pt)2
1 6:5 5:8 (89%) 0:7 (11%)
2 22:8 2:6 (11%) 20:2 (89%)
3 28:8 13:0 (45%) 15:8 (55%)
4 50:1 16:6 (33%) 33:6 (67%)
5 18:7 10:0 (53%) 8:7 (47%)
6 16:5 6:8 (41%) 9:7 (59%)
Table 2: Di¤erent measures for the individual prediction strategies (in thousands).
Between brackets is the percentage of the average individual error that can be at-
tributed to the average dispersion error and the average common error, respectively.
From Table 2 it is clear that at least for groups 2 ¡ 6, only a relatively small
part (ranging from 11% in group 2 to 53% in group 5) of the average quadratic
forecasting error (…rst column) can be explained by the dispersion in expectations
(second column).13 This con…rms our conjecture that there is coordination on a com-
mon prediction strategy. The observation that a relatively large part of the average
quadratic forecast error is due to the di¤erence between the average expectation and
the realized price (third column) implies that “rational expectations with error” is
not a good description of participants’ expectation formation. In fact, it suggests
that participants’ mistakes are correlated. We therefore conclude that participants
make signi…cant forecasting errors, and they are alike in the way that they make these
forecasting errors.
12This is consistent with Muth (1961, p.316) who gives the following formulation of the rational
expectations hypothesis: “The hypothesis can be rephrased a little more precisely as follows: that
expectations of …rms (or, more generally, the subjective probability distribution of outcomes) tend
to be distributed, for the same information set, about the prediction of the theory (or the “ob jective”
probability distributions of outcomes).” In other words, individual expectations may be wrong, but
in the aggregate expectations should be approximately correct.
13Recall that in group 1 in periods 7, 11 and 29, the realized price is disturbed by an extreme
prediction by one of the participants. The relatively high dispersion of expectations in group 1 can
be attributed to these periods. If we exclude these three periods we …nd averages (in thousands)
of 1:3, 0:6 and 0:7 respectively. These latter numbers are consistent with the results for the other
groups.
20
Page 20 of 26 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
The analysis of Table 2 suggests that participants make structural forecast er-
rors. Note that if participants’ forecast error is correlated with available information,
they can improve their prediction. To test whether participants exploit the available
information optimally we computed, for each participant, the …rst 10 lags of the au-
tocorrelation function of the time series of forecast errors pt ¡ peht, where we again
only used the last 40 observations. The signi…cant lags are presented in Table 3.
group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4 group 5 group 6
part. 1 – 1-4-5 – 1-3-4-10 1 –
part. 2 – 1-5-6 1 1-3-4-10 1 1-9-10
part. 3 – 1-4 1 1 1 1-2
part. 4 1 1-4-5 – 1-3-4 – 1-2-9
part. 5 – 1-4 1-2 1-3-4-10 1 1-9-10
part. 6 – 1-2-5-9 1 4 1 1-9-10
Table 3: Autocorrelation structure of individual forecast errors
Notice that the autocorrelation function of the forecast errors is signi…cant at
the …rst lag for many participants. However, participants do not have pt in their
information set when predicting pt+1. Hence, they re not able to exploit the …rst
order autocorrelation structure in the forecast errors to improve their predictions.
Therefore we should focus on higher order lags of the autocorrelation function. We
thus …nd that for about half of the participants there is no exploitable structure in
the forecast errors. Notice that the di¤erences between autocorrelation patterns of
participants within groups is much smaller than the di¤erences of the autocorrelation
patterns between groups. Participants in group 1 have almost no structure in their
forecast errors, whereas most participants in groups 3 and 5 only have signi…cant
autocorrelation at the …rst lag, which is innocuous. There is much more structure in
the forecast errors of the participants from groups 2, 4 and 6. The fact that autocor-
relation of individual forecasting errors in groups 2, 4 and 6 are similar suggests that
individual forecasting error in these groups are correlated. Half of the participants do
not exploit all structure in the forecast errors. For these participants it might be the
case that they are still in the process of exploiting this structure by adapting their
prediction strategies. The analysis of the individual prediction strategies leads us to
the conclusion that participants make structural forecasting errors and deviate from
rationality, but they tend to deviate from rationality in a common way. Finally, it
is interesting to consider only the observations along the …rst bubbles (the …rst 23,
26, 18, 27 and 28 observations for groups 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6). Along these …rst bubbles
we …nd signi…cant lags of the autocorrelation function of the forecast errors for only
8 participants. That is, a vast majority of the participants do not make structural
forecast errors until the price has reached its upper bound.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we investigated expectation formation in a stationary asset pricing ex-
periment. Participants have su¢cient information to compute the constant rational
expectations fundamental price. In 5 of the 6 experiments a price bubble emerges
endogenously with prices attaining values of 16 times their fundamental value. The
growth rates of these experimental bubbles are inconsistent with rational expecta-
tions.
The bubbles observed in our experiment seem to be triggered by the trend follow-
ing behavior of participants: when observing a small price increase, they predict the
price to increase even further, after which this price increase becomes self-ful…lling.
These positive feedback expectations seem to drive much of the dynamics. Although
the experimental bubbles do not correspond to rational bubbles the excess returns of
the asset along the …rst bubble does not exhibit a signi…cant autocorrelation struc-
ture. In this sense the market is informationally e¢cient. At an individual level,
the analysis in Section 5 has revealed that the average dispersion between individual
prediction strategies of participants within a group tends to be relatively small in
comparison to their average individual forecast error. This suggests that individuals
seem to coordinate on a common prediction strategy.
It is worthwhile confronting our experimental results with some theoretical work
on expectation formation and learning. In a recent paper, Guesnerie discusses the
concept of strong rationality as a way to evaluate theoretical possibilities of coordi-
nation of economic predictions on a particular equilibrium. A rational expectations
steady state solution is strongly rational if common knowledge of the agents that the
equilibrium is in some neighborhood of the rational expectations steady state implies
that the equilibrium must be equal to the steady state; see Guesnerie for a detailed
discussion. Guesnerie argues that an equilibrium that is not strongly rational cannot
be self-enforcing. It follows directly from his results that the rational expectations
fundamental price in the asset pricing model considered here is (globally) strongly
rational, and therefore in theory the fundamental steady state may be self-enforcing.
However, in our asset pricing model experiments participants are unable to learn the
fundamental price; instead, in 5 out of 6 groups, participants learn to coordinate on
an exploding bubble solution.
Evans and Honkapohja provide an extensive recent survey of theoretical work on
expectation formation and learning. They emphasize the concept of expectational
stability (E-stability) of rational expectations solutions. A rational expectations so-
lution is E-stable if a recursive stochastic learning algorithm, such as ordinary least
squares (OLS), converges to this solution. In the representative agent asset pricing
model under learning, the fundamental price is E-stable, whereas the rational bubbles
are not E-stable; see Evans and Honkapohja (Section 9.7, pp.220-222). This theory
thus predicts that boundedly rational agents observing time series of past prices are
able to learn the rational expectations fundamental price. In contrast with these
theoretical results, in our asset pricing experiments heterogeneous participants are
unable to learn the fundamental price, but instead learn to coordinate on an explod-
ing bubble solution. It is remarkable that Evans and Honkapohja (p.222) point out
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that “for some initial values of parameter estimates, the paths under learning will
not converge to the fundamental solution but instead follow a nonrational divergent
trajectory”. The bubbles observed in our experimental results seem to be consistent
with this possibility of a ‘nonrational divergent trajectory’.
Clearly, there are signi…cant discrepancies between the predictions of theoretical
models such as least squares learning, strong rationality and expectational stability
and the outcomes of the experiment. However, some care should be taken in in-
terpreting those discrepancies since the information requirements for the theoretical
models are not satis…ed in the experiment. In the experiment, for example, it was
not common knowledge that the price was below 1000, let alone that the price was
in a small neighborhood around the fundamental price, as is required for strong ra-
tionality. Also notions of E-stability and (real-time) adaptive learning assume that
people know at least the correct structure of the underlying asset pricing economy.
The recurring bubbles and crashes observed in our experiments are similar to the
periodically collapsing bubbles studied by Blanchard (1979), Blanchard and Watson
(1982) and Evans (1991). These (rational) bubbles collapse with a certain probability
each period and restart again after a collapse. As long as they do not collapse they
have to grow faster than a ‘regular’ rational bubble, as was also the case in our exper-
iments. The observed crashes in our experiments however seem to be mainly caused
by new information about the upper bound of 1000, entering the market as soon as
one of the participants …nds out about the upperbound when trying to enter a forecast
larger than 1000. Only in group 6 does the bubble stop and reverse without prices
and forecasts reaching their maximum upper bound. These bubbles and crashes are
consistent with the type of evolutionary learning introduced in Brock and Hommes
(1997). In particular, Brock and Hommes (1998) apply this evolutionary framework
to the same asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs that underlies our experi-
ments. Evolutionary switching of bounde ly rational agents between trend following
strategies and fundamental market analysis indeed produces recurring bubbles and
crashes similar to our experimental results.
Finally, we relate our …nding that participants coordinate on a common predic-
tion strategy to some related recent experimental work on expectation formation.
First note that this coordination result is particularly striking since participants do
not observe each others’ predictions and therefore can only coordinate through the
realized market prices. Moreover, along these common prediction strategies signi…-
cant forecast errors are made. Hommes et al. investigate expectation formation in a
closely related asset pricing model extended with a robot trader, believing that prices
will move in the dire tion of the fundamental. In the presence of the robot trader
speculative bubbles occur less frequently and are not as strong. In these experiments
coordination on a common prediction strategy was also found, suggesting that this
coordination is a robust feature in this type of experiment. Van de Velden investi-
gates expectation formation in an experimental cobweb model of a commodity market
with a production lag. It turns out that in this cobweb experiment participants are
able to learn the correct price level (although there is excess volatility in prices for
treatments where the cobweb model is unstable under naive expectations). No coor-
dination of prediction seems to take place in this experiment. To understand this it
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is important to note that the cobweb model has an expectations reversing structure:
a high predicted price leads to a high production level and therefore to a low realized
market equilibrium price and vice versa. There is therefore an incentive to disagree
with the majority of the other participants. This helps participants learn the correct
price level. In contrast, the asset pricing model discussed in the present paper has
an expectations con…rming structure in the sense that a high predicted price leads
to a high demand for the risky asset and therefore to a high market equilibrium
price. In the asset pricing framework participants do not seem to be able to learn
the fundamental price level. The market institution and the nature of the expec-
tations feedback structure therefore seem to play a pivotal role in the dynamics of
market equilibrium prices. Heemeijer et al. (2006) test this hypothesis by running an
experiment on expectation formation with two treatments that are equivalent in all
dimensions except for the sign of the expectations feedback structure. In the positive
feedback treatment with an expectations con…rming structure, there are persistent
deviations from fundamentals and coordination on a common prediction strategy, and
in the negative feedback structure, with an expectations reversing structure, there is
fast convergence to the fundamental value and no coordination of predictions before
the steady state is reached. More experimental work on expectation formation and
learning in dynamic markets is useful to understand which expectations hypothesis
is most relevant in economic modelling.
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